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The present thesis studies how a widely-accessible and interest-bearing CBDC affects the 
inside-outside money competition mechanism and in turn monetary equilibria. Consumers 
perception of CBDC as an alternative to bank deposits and the structure of the banking sector 
are crucial factors to determine the CBDC role in such a mechanism. Given imperfect 
competition in the banking sector, CBDC is found to be an effective monetary policy tool 
capable of influencing households’ money-holdings directly through the deposit rate channel. 
In particular, the higher the substitutability across the two forms of digital money, the higher 
the correlation between the interest rates they bear. 
 
A presente tese estuda como uma CBDC acessível pelo público e com juros afeta o 
mecanismo de competição pela moeda e, por sua vez, os equilíbrios monetários. A percepção 
dos consumidores sobre a CBDC como alternativa aos depósitos bancários e a estrutura do 
setor bancário são fatores cruciais para determinar o papel da CBDC nesse mecanismo. 
Dada a concorrência imperfeita no setor bancário, constata-se que o CBDC é um 
instrumento eficaz de política monetária capaz de influenciar os agregados familiares 
diretamente através do canal de taxa de depósito. Em particular, quanto maior a 
substituibilidade entre as duas formas de moeda digital, maior a correlação entre as suas 
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In order to lay a common ground for all readers to understand the theme discussed, this thesis 
introduction is organized in three subparagraphs. The first one introduces the reader to CBDC 
definition, taxonomy and design; in the second one a variety of arguments on CBDC 
desirability are proposed; in the third one, the key questions and the objectives of the thesis 
are provided. 
The thesis is articulated in 5 chapters. After the introduction, the literature review (chapter 2) 
and the models (chapter 3) are presented. At last, chapter 4 contains results and in chapter 5 
conclusions are drawn. 
1.1 CBDC DEFINITION, TAXONOMY AND DESIGN 
Central bank digital currency (CBDC), also known as digital base money (DBM), is a new 
innovative type of central bank money, and is generically defined as (i) a central bank (CB) 
liability, (ii) assuming digital form, (iii) denominated in the legal unit of account, (iv) 
different than reserve balances or settlement accounts. 
In order to understand better what CBDC is and how it relates to other types of money, a 
Venn-diagram is proposed in Figure 1. The diagram illustrates a taxonomy of money based 
on the combination of four key properties: (i) issuer (central bank or not), (ii) form (digital or 




physical), (iii) accessibility (wide or restricted) and (iv) technology (account-based or token-
based)1. Referring back to the definition, the first two properties are decisive for CBDC to be 
defined as such. The other two properties combined allow us to distinguish between CBDC 
families (dark grey areas in Figure 1): (i) public CB accounts, (ii) public CB token, (iii) and 
wholesale CB token. 
CBDC can bear various design features. The main features concern: availability (24/7 or 
limited), anonymity, transfer mechanism (centralized or decentralized), interest-bearing, 
presence of limits or caps. 
The combination of all these features, namely the chosen CBDC design, will determine the 
attractiveness of CBDC for the public, as well as the way it will interact with other elements 
into the economy. In particular, the interest-bearing feature can make the difference between a 
policy tool and a mere payment mean; anonymity and availability can result as attractive 
properties playing a role in the money competition mechanism; while limits and/or caps on 
quantities can be useful for the policy maker to control eventual undesirable implications or to 
steer usage in a certain direction. 
This thesis is focused on widely accessible CBDC. Indeed accessibility for the general public 
seems to represent a key feature to make CBDC a relevant policy tool. For this reason, I will 
provide only a separate and short hint on wholesale CB token in Box 1. 
Public CB accounts would be nothing else than deposits that can be held by the public at the 
CB. They would differ from bank deposits in the underlying riskiness, in the interest rate paid 
out, in the efficiency of payments and settlements. 
It has to be noted that account-based CBDC would then require the CB to know a lot about its 
"customers", and this raises the question of whether the CB wants to get involved in this kind 
of client-firm relation with citizens. 
Token-based CBDC would represent the legal tender in a fashion resembling a 
cryptocurrency. It would represent a solution where CB stays aside from providing a direct 
service to the public. Despite the fact this kind of money has never been adopted so far, 
distributed ledger technology (DLT) appears to be the best candidate to back the instrument 
                                                          
1 Account- and token-based money are distinguished by identification requirement. For the former, the key 
question is whether a transaction has been made by the true owner of the account or by a thief; for the latter, 
the key question is whether the transferred money is valuable or counterfeit. As you can notice from the Venn-
diagram, CB reserve is account-based money while Bitcoin (private digital token on the graph) is token-based 
money. An account-based CBDC would then take the same form of actual reserves while a CB token would 




functioning. Although DLT maturity in the field of central banking is still uncertain for the 
purpose of implementation. 
  
Several concrete examples of CBDC or initiative on the matter have been carried out up to 
today. The ones definitely noteworthy are: 
 Implemented CBDC: 
Dinero electrónico, implemented by the CB of Ecuador, it was a concrete example of 
widely accessible CBDC through CB accounts. Citizens could open an account online 
through the official app, and deposit/withdraw money at designated transaction 
centers. CB of Ecuador was, therefore, competing against the private sector in 
Box 1.  Wholesale CB token 
Digital CB money is already available in the form of reserves or settlements to 
monetary counterparties and some non-monetary counterparties. Therefore a 
wholesale CB token would not sound as a novelty if the set of potential recipients 
matched the today CB monetary interlocutors. 
On the matters of monetary policy and financial stability, the effects of CBDC 
issuance are supposed to be strictly related to how vast the pool of users is and 
whether it is attractively remunerated. Indeed, as pointed out by the Bank for 
International Settlement, a well-remunerated wholesale CBDC accessible by 
institutional investors can influence their holdings of low-risk instruments (short-term 
government bills, repos, etc.) and then it would help establish a hard floor under 
money market rates. This contingency is benefic in terms of narrowing policy rates 
dispersion, which is identified as a primary indicator of the level of passthrough 
inefficiency. Furthermore, such wholesale CBDC would represent a positive tool to 
make the settlement systems more efficient and secure, and to help CB financial 
activity monitoring2. 
1 Passthrough Efficiency in the Fed’s New Monetary Policy Setting, Darrell Duffie and Arvind Krishnamurthy. 
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University. (Text available here: 
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/duffiekrishnamurthy.pdf) 
2   Central Bank Digital Currency, Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructure, Markets Committee. Bank for 






providing a service for retail transactions. The money was made available for usage in 
2015 and it is now in a state of decommissioning, because of scarce usage. 
E-dinar, implemented by Tunisia postal authority in 2015, and E-CFA, adopted in 
Senegal first (2017) and possibly in all the UEMOA countries in the future, seems to 
follow basically the same structure of the Ecuadorian CBDC, but very few clear 
information are available in this regard. 
 E-krona, still in the process of experimentation by the Riskbank, represents a clear 
example of widely accessible CBDC. The Swedish CB will make use of such 
innovation as a reaction to the unceasing decline in the use of cash observed in the 
country. With the objective of offering a sort of “digital cash”, the design features 
would be trivially oriented toward a combination of anonymity/integrity, unlimited 
availability, no interest-bearing, and decentralized transfer mechanism; but concretely 
Riskbank left other possibilities –like a centralized interest-bearing CBDC- open. 
 DNBcoin, developed by the Dutch National Bank only for internal test purposes, is a 
prototype token-based CBDC, experimented in two versions, which gave important 
results and feedback on how technically good a DLT is in backing legal tender. The 
third prototype seems to look toward applications in the field of financial market 
infrastructures for the settlement of complex financial transactions2. On this same 
matter, Bank of Canada has run research under the project Gasper and Bank of 
Singapore under the project Ubin. 
 
1.2 WIDELY ACCESSIBLE CBDC DESIRABILITY 
Why should a CB issue CBDC? There are several points in favour of CBDC issuance, and 
there are as many counter-arguments. Whether CBDC is desirable for a country’s economy it 
will depend on how those pros and cons balance for that specific case. 
In general, we can recognise three broad areas of motivations for CBDC issuance: (i) 
monetary policy (MP) transmission and implementation; (ii) competitiveness and efficiency 
of payment systems; (iii) financial inclusion –to which Box 2 is dedicated-. 
Regarding MP transmission and implementation, wider digital access to the C may strengthen 
the pass-through of the policy rate trough the transmission channels to money and lending 
                                                          




markets, especially if CBDC results attractively designed (mainly in terms of anonymity and 
interest-bearing). For example, if households considered retail interest-bearing CBDC to be a 
substitute to bank deposits, banks would have less scope for independently setting the interest 
rate on retail deposits. Indeed banks would find it harder not to increase deposit rates in 
tandem with the CBDC rate, which in turn would become a direct MP tool to depositors. 
One more point on this matter is that CBDC can possibly serve as an instrument to alleviate 
the zero lower bound if designed to tolerate negative interest rates. For this to be effective, it 
could be needed a simultaneous withdrawal of higher denomination banknotes or a general 
abating the demand for cash3. On this matter, Francisco Rivadeneyra4’s claim is noteworthy: 
 
"When you have a CBDC which can bear a positive or negative interest rate you have much 
more power for implementing MP. So, in theory, it should be welfare improving. But how 
people would feel to be charged with negative rates is unknown". 
                                                          
3 “Monetary Policy and Digital Currencies: Much Ado about Nothing?”, Christian Pfister, Bank of France. 
4 Francisco Rivadeneyra is Senior Researcher Advisor at Bank of Canada. The citation has been extracted from 
the panel debate “The impact of CBDC (Central Bank Digital Currency) and its current state” organized by 
Deconomy. The debate is available online on the official page of the association: 





1.3 THESIS OBJECTIVES 
Core central banking is about monetary policy, financial stability, and payment services. 
Money is indeed the beating heart of central banks activity. 
Unsurprisingly, CBDC has become an increasingly interesting topic for research and 
discussion in the CB field as it could have the potential to be positively impactful on the 
matters of monetary policy, financial stability and payment services5. 
                                                          
5 Central Bank Digital Currency, Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructure, Markets Committee. Bank for International Settlement. 
(Text available here: https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d174.htm ). 
 
Box 2  Financial Inclusion  
Financial inclusion means the possibility of an economic agent to access money and 
therefore participate in the economic machine. As the world moves toward a less usage of 
cash, replacing it with technological solutions, a part of society –made of people 
uncomfortable, unable or unauthorized to use those technological solutions- may result 
marginalized. 
CBDC is often indicated as an instrument capable of fostering financial inclusion, as it can 
be designed to allow almost everyone to access it.  
Developed countries, which are well endowed in their means of payments, may not need a 
CBDC to foster furthermore financial inclusion or transfers efficiency. In countries like 
Sweden –where cash is disappearing- this theme is important instead, as many individuals 
who cannot access bank accounts could end up financially excluded. In an underdeveloped 
country it would instead represent a terrific innovation capable of including into the 
financial world many citizens today marginalized, and capable of making the payment 
system relevantly more efficient for the benefit of all the economic participants. 
On this same regard, we also have to recognized the role of CBDC as a resiliency resort: 
while cash is likely to represent the ultimate resiliency ground against a total disruption of 
the payment system, a CBDC (reliant on a separate system) would represent a resiliency 
ground to guarantee remote payments in case of private-sector knock-out.  
In other words, CBDC can foster financial inclusion –especially in underdeveloped 






On a broader level, CBDC raises questions about the role of central bank money, direct access 
to central bank liabilities and the structure of financial intermediation. 
While all these themes are going to be on the background of the writing, the present thesis 
will focus on the specific aspect of inside-outside money competition. 
In particular, the objectives of such dissertation are: (i) to recreate an interesting theoretical 
framework for inside-outside money competition analysis at the light of a widely accessible 
interest-bearing CBDC presence into the economy; (ii) to study the role of such CBDC into 
the competition mechanisms through the specified theoretical framework; (iii) to formalize 
how CBDC can be useful for the scope of MP. 
For this end, I will make use of a monetary equilibrium model where households are provided 
with government-issued outside-money in both cash and CBDC forms, and with privately-
issued inside-money in the form of deposits. In particular, the agents interacting in such a 
frame will be: (i) households, (ii) government, and (iii) financial intermediaries.  
While each agent behaviour is obviously key to the resulting competition mechanism, the 
agents’ behaviour is not obvious in its-self, even more so if we are concerned with something 
still experimental like CBDC is:  
 How does the public perceive CBDC related to other types of money? Are CBDC and 
bank deposits treated as substitutes or complements? And if they are treated as 
substitutes, are they perfect or imperfect substitutes?  
 How does the government make use of CBDC? Is it going to be a seigniorage-
revenues maximization tool? Or is it going to foster welfare? 
 How do financial intermediaries compete in the supply of inside-money? What is the 
cost structure they face? 
The present thesis pretends to address the over-mentioned objectives by engaging in a 
discussion for the listed unresolved questions.  
As a warning, it has to be said that all the issues concerning CBDC technological feasibility, 
implementability and CB credibility threat are omitted. On the other hand, the theme of 
CBDC desirability is central for such a dissertation, which pretends indeed to draw some pros 






2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The main reference for this thesis is Marimon et al. (2003). The paper presents a theoretical 
framework for studying competition between inside and outside money. The researchers find 
that inside money competition may (i) have a disciplinary role on equilibrium inflation by 
imposing an upper bound constraint, in the case of a fully committed revenues maximizing 
CB; (ii) drive outside money out of circulation as inside money issuers become more and 
more efficient, in the case of non-fully committed revenue-maximizing CB; (iii) have no 
impact on the economy, in the case of a Ramsey government pursuing the Friedman rule. 
Davoodalhosseini (2018) estimates that the gains from introducing an account-based interest-
bearing CBDC in Canada as an increase in consumption by around 16%. He uses a model 
where CBDC is supposed to be more costly for agents to use than cash because of the absence 
of anonymity, and where CBDC have discriminating rates (household rate and business rate). 
Chiu et al. (2019) build a model with imperfect competition in the banking sector which 
shows that CBDC, even in the case of low usage, would serve as an outside option for 
households, thus limiting banks’ market power in the deposit market. So they estimate that 
CBDC can raise bank lending by around 7% and increase output by around 1%. 
Michael Kumhof and Clare Noone (2018) offer three models where an interest-bearing CBDC 
is accessible in different sectors (wholesale, public, and indirect public) where they study the 
question of how CBDC could affect the size and composition of commercial bank balance 
sheets. They find that if the introduction of CBDC follows a set of core principles, bank 
funding is not necessarily reduced, credit and liquidity provision to the private sector need not 
to contract, and the risk of a system-wide run from bank deposits to CBDC is addressed. 
John Barrdear and Michael Kumhof (2016) elaborate a monetary DSGE model to study the 
macroeconomic consequences of a widely accessible interest-bearing CBDC. They find that 
CBDC issuance of 30% of GDP, against government bonds, could permanently raise GDP by 
as much as 3%, due to reductions in real interest rates, distortionary taxes, and monetary 
transaction costs. In their view, countercyclical CBDC price or quantity rules, as a second 





3 THE MODEL 
All the models that will be presented represent a more or less elaborated extension of 
Marimon et al. (2003). The economy is populated by a representative household, one or more 
financial intermediaries, and a government. While Marimon et al. (2003) study the interaction 
between cash and bank deposits in the specific context of money perfect substitutability and 
perfect competition in the banking sector, in the present thesis a widely-accessible CBDC is 
included into the competition framework and various scenarios –that allow making useful 
confrontations to learn how diverse environments would lead CBDC to play a different role 
into the money competition mechanism- are taken into account. The scenarios are going to be 
dependent on whether: 
(i) Households treat CBDC and bank deposit as perfect or imperfect substitutes, 
(ii) The banking sector is perfectly or imperfectly competitive, 
(iii) The government is a Ramsey-government or a transfer-maximizer. 
3.1 HOUSEHOLD 
The household maximizes an objective function, V, which involve consumption of a money-
good, 𝑐𝑡
1, consumption of a credit-good, 𝑐𝑡
2, and total labour, 𝑛𝑡, for an infinite number of 
periods starting from t=0, 
𝑉 =∑𝛽𝑡[ 𝑢(𝑐𝑡
1) +  𝑢(𝑐𝑡




The household is endowed with a unit of time which is spendable for leisure and total labour. 
Part of the total labour supplied serves as a mean to deposits issuance, 𝑐𝑡
𝑓
, and the rest is used 
for the production of consumption goods, respectively 𝑛𝑡
1 and 𝑛𝑡
2.  
Consumption goods production is obtained through a one-to-one relation to labour, so that 
equilibrium in the goods markets requires, 
𝑐𝑡
1 = 𝑛𝑡
1   𝑎𝑛𝑑   𝑐𝑡
2 = 𝑛𝑡
2. 









Money-good and credit-good are intended as in Lucas and Stokey (1987). Therefore, payment 
instruments are needed to carry out the money-good consumption period after period. The 
payment instruments household is possibly supplied with are: (i) cash, 𝑀𝑡, namely physical 
currency; (ii) CBDC, 𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶𝑡, designed to be widely-accessible and interest-bearing; (iii) bank 
deposit, 𝐸𝑡, intended as a digital currency substitute privately issued by financial 
intermediaries. All those payment means are indifferently effective for purchases and they are 
always traded at par6. The first two payment instruments will be referred to as outside-money, 
as they represent CB liabilities, while bank deposits are inside-money. Note that cash is 
unable to pay interests because of its physical nature, while digital instruments bear gross 
interest rates respectively referred to as  𝐼𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶 and  𝐼𝑓.  
Note that the household’s payment preferences are solely based on money return, namely the 
interest rate paid by money itself, and they do not account for other potentially relevant 
factors such as anonymity, riskiness and usability7. Money holdings held in a given period 𝑡 
will act as inputs for the payment function Ɀ𝑡, which in turn will determine the effective 
monetary output usable for money-good consumption. Such payment function is 
homogeneous of degree one and pretends to parametrically reflect money substitutability 
grades: 












Where the parameter 𝜌 measures substitutability between cash and digital money, and 𝜑 is 
instead the substitutability between CBDC and bank deposits. They vary between zero 
(included) and one (excluded), where the zero-level corresponds to perfect substitutability. 
We will consider (i) the case where cash is perceived as imperfect substitute of digital money, 
while CBDC and deposits are treated as perfect substitutes, namely 𝜑 = 0 and 𝜌 ∈ (0,1); (ii) 
and a more general case where all types of money are treated as imperfect substitutes (to 
simplify the analysis the substitutability parameters are set equal, so that 𝜌 = 𝜑, 𝜌 ∈ (0,1) ).  
Transactions timing follows Svensson (1985). The good market meets at the beginning of the 
period: the household purchases money-goods, consume money-goods and credit-goods. 
After that, the asset market meets: the credit-goods, real wages, 𝑛𝑡, and government transfers, 
                                                          
6 Cash, CBDC and deposits may be traded with a diverse exchange rate each. For the purposes of the thesis, this 
eventuality is phased out by assumption, so that the agents can convert every type of money into others one-
to-one. 
7 People may perceive cash as costly to hold because of physical inefficiency. While digital money appears to 




𝑔𝑡, are paid and the household adjusts its portfolios of payment instruments and bonds, 𝑏𝑡
ℎ. 
Bonds pay a gross interest rate 𝐼𝑡 ≡ (
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑃𝑡
) 𝑅𝑡+1, where 𝑃𝑡 and 𝑅𝑡 are respectively the price 
level and the real interest rate at time 𝑡. As a consequence, in each period  the households will 
have to carry a portfolio of payment instruments to the next period in order to accommodate 
the future money-good consumption. 
We assume that the bond rate is always above money rates, which constitutes a classic 
monetary friction: the households want to limit the exposure to money-holding inefficiency, 
given by the cost-opportunity of missing a bond investment. The absence of such an 
assumption would include into the analysis the possibility of the zero lower bound, a topic 
closely related to CBDC –as we saw in the introduction-, which need special attention and 
focus that this paper will not dedicate. 
The household problem is then formalized as follows: 
𝑀𝐴𝑋                        𝑉 
{𝑐𝑡
1, 𝑐𝑡
2, 𝑛𝑡 , 𝑀𝑡+1, 𝐸𝑡+1, 𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶𝑡+1, 𝑏𝑡+1
ℎ , } 
 
 𝑀𝑡+1 + 𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶𝑡+1 + 𝐸𝑡+1 + 𝑏𝑡+1






2) + 𝑃𝑡𝑛𝑡 + 𝑃𝑡𝑔𝑡 + 𝜋𝑡 
 
𝑃𝑡  𝑐𝑡












𝐸0 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛  
In order to simply the algebra, the marginal conditions are derived under the assumption that 
𝜑 = 𝜌 and 𝜌 ∈ (0,1), namely cash is assumed as substitutable for deposits as CBDC. 
The resulting Lagrangian is: 
 𝐿 = ∑ 𝛽𝑡[ 𝑢(𝑐𝑡
1) +  𝑢(𝑐𝑡
2) − 𝛼 𝑛𝑡]
∞







2) + 𝑃𝑡𝑛𝑡 + 𝑃𝑡𝑔𝑡 + 𝜋𝑡 −𝑀𝑡+1 − 𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶𝑡+1 − 𝐸𝑡+1 − 𝑏𝑡+1









1−𝜌 − 𝑃𝑡  𝑐𝑡
1] 
The problem’s FOCs are: 
(𝑐𝑡+1
1 )            𝛽𝑡+1 𝑢′(𝑐𝑡+1
1 ) = 𝑃𝑡+1[𝜆𝑡+1 + 𝜏𝑡+1] 
(𝑐𝑡
2)               𝛽𝑡 𝑢′(𝑐𝑡




(𝑛𝑡)               𝛽
𝑡 𝛼 =  𝑃𝑡𝜆𝑡 











(𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶𝑡+1)         𝜆𝑡 = 𝜆𝑡+1 𝐼𝑡+1











(𝐸𝑡+1)          𝜆𝑡 = 𝜆𝑡+1𝐼𝑡+1
𝑓











(𝑏𝑡+1)          𝑃𝑡𝜆𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡+1𝜆𝑡+1𝑅       Where 𝐼𝑡+1 =
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑃𝑡
 𝑅, so that 𝜆𝑡 = 𝜆𝑡+1 𝐼𝑡+1 
(𝜆𝑡+1)          𝑀𝑡+1 + 𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶𝑡+1 + 𝐸𝑡+1 + 𝑏𝑡+1𝑃𝑡
= 𝑀𝑡 + 𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶𝑡 𝐼𝑡
𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶 + 𝐼𝑡
𝑓
𝐸𝑡 + 𝑃𝑡𝑏𝑡𝑅 − 𝑃𝑡(𝑐𝑡
1 + 𝑐𝑡
2) + 𝑃𝑡𝑛𝑡 + 𝑃𝑡𝑔𝑡 + 𝜋𝑡 










Furthermore, consider the following set of variables:  
st+1  ≡  𝐼𝑡+1 − 𝐼𝑡+1
𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶. This differential will be called “policy spread” as it results from 
government’s policy. In the eyes of the household, it represents the cost-opportunity of 
holding CBDC. In the government’s eyes it measures CBDC marginal seigniorage revenue, 
indeed such spread indicates how cheap CBDC issuance is with respect to debt. 
θt+1 ≡ 𝐼𝑡+1 − 𝐼𝑡+1
𝑓
. This differential will be called “intermediation spread” as it comes from 
financial intermediaries. In the eyes of households, it plays as the cost opportunity of holding 
bank deposits. For banks, it is instead the marginal revenue gained through deposit issuance, 
under the assumption that they invest all the deposit inflows in bonds. 










2) and (𝑛𝑡) the marginal condition for credit-good consumption is 
derived: 








Credit-good consumption depends on the marginal disutility of labour and on consumption 
preferences. The agent will continue consuming credit-goods as long as its marginal utility 
compensates for the disutility of labour. Obviously, credit-good consumption choice is 




Combining (𝐸𝑡+1), (𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶𝑡+1), (𝑀𝑡+1) and (𝑏𝑡+1), marginal conditions for relative demand 
of payment instruments are obtained: 




















CBDC demand relative to deposits is given by the relative convenience of CBDC holding 
with respect to deposits, namely the spreads ratio, and by the grade of money substitutability.  
CBDC demand relative to cash follows the exact same principle, where (It+1 − 1) is 
interpreted as the cost opportunity of holding cash. Therefore, when the policy spread equals 
the intermediation spread, households will be demanding CBDC and deposits in the same 
extent; when the policy spread equals the cost-opportunity of holding cash, households will be 
demanding the same quantity of CBDC and cash. 
Note that lower substitutability parameters make money types more substitutable. In other 
words, the elasticity of money demand increases. As a result, households become more 
susceptible to interest rate shifts, and in the extreme case of perfect substitutability –where 
 𝜌 = 0- they will be willing to hold only the most remunerative mean of payment. 
Note that in the most general case where 𝜌 ≠ 𝜑, namely cash is not as substitutable as CBDC 
with respect to deposits, the CBDC-to-cash ratio is not as simple as described in equation 3, 
but the ratio is complicated by a factor which grows with the substitutability parameters 
discrepancy. 










Solving the whole system of FOCs, the money demands and money-good are obtained: 







𝑚   
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒  𝐻𝑡+1





































































(𝑒𝑞. 7)         𝑐𝑡+1








𝑒 )−𝜌 = (𝐼𝑡+1 − 1)(𝐻𝑡+1
𝑚 )−𝜌. 
 
Money demands are determined in equilibrium as functions of the labour disutility, 
consumption preferences, spreads combination and the level of money substitutability 
parameters. When the policy spread increases, coherently with the assumption of imperfect 
substitutability of money substitutes, CBDC demand gets deteriorated while deposits and cash 
demand improve. In particular, as illustrated in Graph 1, given the parameterization provided 
in table 1, deposit and cash demands are concave and increasing functions of the policy 
spread while CBDC demand is a decreasing and convex function of the policy spread. An 
intuition to understand why the former are concave while the latter is convex, lies in equation 
7: note that as the policy spread increases, the optimal money-good consumption falls ceteris 
paribus. Given that the cash-in-advance constraint is binding, less money-good consumption 
means less money held in aggregate. As a result, when the policy spread increases CBDC is 






Accordingly, when the intermediation spread grows, deposit demand gets dimed while CBDC 
and cash become more demanded (ceteris paribus). This mechanics is illustrated in Graph 3, 
where the dashed curves represent the new demands after the intermediation spread increases 
from 1% to 1.5%. 
 
Furthermore, the substitutability parameter is key in the determination of the household 
portfolio composition. As Graph 4 and Graph 5 show, given the parameterization in table 1, 
money demands become steeper and steeper as 𝜌 approaches zero because of the enlargement 
of demand elasticity. 
 
 





  Graph 2   





  Graph 4   








The optimal money-good consumption is determined in equilibrium as a function of the linear 
cost of labour, consumption preferences, spreads and money substitutability (contained in the 
algorithm 𝐻𝑡+1). Everything else constant, higher spreads mean less money-good 
consumption because holding money becomes more costly, namely relatively less convenient 
than a bond investment. This is clearly shown in Graph 6. 
 
 
Perfect substitutability case 
Assume 𝜑 = 0 and 𝜌 ∈ (0,1). Then we have: 
 Ɀ𝑡(𝑀𝑡, 𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶𝑡, 𝐸𝑡) = [𝑀𝑡
1−𝜌




The new FOCs are: 





1 )′            𝛽𝑡+1 𝑢′(𝑐𝑡+1
1 ) = 𝑃𝑡+1[𝜆𝑡+1 + 𝜏𝑡+1] 
(𝑐𝑡
2)′               𝛽𝑡 𝑢′(𝑐𝑡
2) = 𝑃𝑡𝜆𝑡 
(𝑛𝑡)′               𝛽
𝑡 𝛼 =  𝑃𝑡𝜆𝑡 
(𝑀𝑡+1)′         𝜆𝑡 = 𝜆𝑡+1 + τt+1  [𝑀𝑡
1−𝜌






(𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶𝑡+1)′         𝜆𝑡 =  𝜆𝑡+1 𝐼𝑡+1
𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶 + τt+1  [𝑀𝑡
1−𝜌
+ (𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶𝑡 + 𝐸𝑡)
1−𝜌]
𝜌
1−𝜌 (𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶𝑡+1 + 𝐸𝑡+1)
−𝜌 
(𝐸𝑡+1)′          𝜆𝑡 = 𝜆𝑡+1𝐼𝑡+1
𝑓
 + τt+1 [𝑀𝑡
1−𝜌
+ (𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶𝑡 + 𝐸𝑡)
1−𝜌]
𝜌
1−𝜌 (𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶𝑡+1 + 𝐸𝑡+1)
−𝜌 
(𝑏𝑡+1)′          𝑃𝑡𝜆𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡+1𝜆𝑡+1𝑅       Where  𝐼𝑡+1 =
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑃𝑡
 𝑅, so that 𝜆𝑡 =  𝜆𝑡+1 𝐼𝑡+1 
(𝜆𝑡+1)′          𝑀𝑡+1 + 𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶𝑡+1 + 𝐸𝑡+1 + 𝑏𝑡+1𝑃𝑡
= 𝑀𝑡 + 𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶𝑡 𝐼𝑡
𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶 + 𝐼𝑡
𝑓
𝐸𝑡 + 𝑃𝑡𝑏𝑡𝑅 − 𝑃𝑡(𝑐𝑡
1 + 𝑐𝑡
2) + 𝑃𝑡𝑛𝑡 + 𝑃𝑡𝑔𝑡 + 𝜋𝑡 
(𝜏𝑡+1)′          𝑃𝑡+1 𝑐𝑡+1
1 = [𝑀𝑡
1−𝜌





Note that (𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶𝑡+1)′ and (𝐸𝑡+1)′ hold at the same time if and only if 𝐼𝑡+1
𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶 = 𝐼𝑡+1
𝑓
. This is 
due to the fact that –given perfectly substitutable digital substitutes - households are willing to 
hold only the most remunerative substitute; and in case of equal remuneration, they are 
actually indifferent on which digital payment means to use. In other words, the sole 
equilibrium where both digital instruments are valued requires remuneration rates equality. 
Graph 7 provides an illustrative explanation by showing how deposit demand –as a function 
of the intermediation spread- shifts when the policy spread moves. So, when 𝜃𝑡+1 = 𝑠𝑡+1 
households hold a portfolio with cash and digital money, where the amount of digital money 
can be optimally any combination of CBDC and deposits, but as soon as the equality gets 









Assuming 𝑠𝑡+1 ≥ 𝜃𝑡+1 and CRRA preferences, the following equations hold in equilibrium: 

















Equation 8 describes how the demand of digital money relative to cash is given by the holding 
costs ratio and by the substitutability level. Note that the right-hand side is identical to the 
right-hand side of equation 3. Remind also that the policy spread is nothing else than the 
difference between the bond rate and the CBDC rate. Therefore, the government strategy in 
setting the CBDC rate turns out to be  key for money demands control: if the CBDC rate was 




set to be autonomous and fixed, an increase in the bond rate would result into an identical 
increase of the policy spread, leaving the CBDC-to-cash ratio unaltered; in the case of a 
CBDC rate anchored to the bond rate –meaning that the government is fixing the policy 
spread  rather than the CBDC rate itself- a bond rate raise would determine a demand shift in 
favour of digital money, as cash would become relatively more costly to hold. 
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Where          𝐻𝑡+1



















Where           𝐻𝑡+1










(eq. 11)        𝑐𝑡+1











𝑚 𝜌   
3.2 FINANCIAL  INTERMEDIARIES 
One or more banks offer deposits, 𝐸𝑡+1
𝑓
, at the pre-mentioned gross interest rate. Assume them 
to be price takers and to honour their liabilities. Assume also that deposits contracts are 
enforceable through banking regulation. In this way, we rule out the possibility of tricky 
banks behaviour, namely over-issuing to deflate liabilities and advantageous defaults. 
The cash flow of the financial intermediary in period 𝑡 ≥ 0 is: 










 𝐼𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡𝑐𝑡
𝑓
 
The financial intermediation technology consists of a real issuance cost, 𝑐𝑡+1
𝑓
, paid for the 













Furthermore, we assume the financial intermediary to be holding the total amount deposited 
as bonds, 𝑃𝑡  𝑏𝑡+1
𝑓
, which pay gross interest 𝐼𝑡+1. So the business strategy of banks is very 
simplified: bank offer deposits to households at a relatively low interest, in order to make a 
margin on bonds. The intermediation spread, 𝜃𝑡+1, which is nothing else than the difference 
between the bond rate and the deposit rate, therefore represents banks’ deposit issuance 
marginal revenue. Banks cash flow becomes, 
(𝜋𝑡+1)   𝐸𝑡+1
𝑓 (𝜃𝑡+1) − 𝑃𝑡+1𝑐𝑡+1
𝑓
.   
Perfect competition case 
Consider = 0 and the banking sector populated by an infinite number of financial 
institutions, which engage in perfect competition. Bank will then offer deposits at the 
marginal issuance cost, implying null profits, 
(eq. 11.51) (𝜋𝑡+1 = 0)    𝜃𝑡+1 = 𝑘 
Perfect competition is then fixing the intermediation spread. 
One bank case 
Consider > 0 and only one bank operating into the banking sector. The single bank’s cash 
flow at time  𝑡 + 1 will be: 















As a result, the single bank will experience a consistent positive inflow, 










If profits constituted an endogenous variable into the household problem, then the household 
could, in some cases, be encouraged to increase deposit holdings as a strategy to get more 
dividends. We want to exclude such behaviour, therefore profits will enter the households’ 




The main difference between the two proposed specifications of the financial intermediary 
problem concerns the intermediation spread equilibrium determination and dynamics. In the 
case of perfect competition there is indeed no dynamics: the only possible equilibrium level of 
the intermediation spread is determined by the zero-profit condition. Such inflexibility can be 
source of inflation boundaries in the case of perfect substitutability of cash and deposits, as 
Marimon et al. (2003) pointed out. Said that, this paper moves from Marimon et al. (2003) 
findings to explore new equilibria in multiple scenarios, with the unprecedented presence of a 
well-designed CBDC. 
If we consider the perfect substitutability case, 𝜌 = 𝜑 = 0, and 𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶𝑡 = 0 ∀𝑡, we are 
essentially back to Marimon et al. (2003), where cash and deposits can be both valued in 
equilibrium only when the bond interest rate is such that the cost opportunity of holding cash 
binds the cost opportunity of deposits holding. As a result, the government turns out to be 
constrained (from above) by inside-money competition in setting the inflation level, otherwise 
the economy would switch into a cashless economy, whose eventuality results problematic 
from the government perspective both in terms of implied seigniorage uselessness and limited 
monetary policy efficacy and implementability.  
3.3 GOVERNMENT 
The government takes policy decisions concerning transfers, 𝑔𝑡, currency supply, 𝑀𝑡 and 
𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶𝑡, and bond supply, 𝑏𝑡, in every period. 𝑀0 and 𝑅0𝑏0 are given. The choice variables 
behind such policy decisions will be 𝑔𝑡, 𝐼𝑡 and 𝐼𝑡
𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶. 
For the sake of simplicity, seigniorage is assumed to be the only source of public revenues. 
When both types of outside-money are valued, the dynamic budget constraint of the 
government is: 
𝑀𝑡+1 + 𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶𝑡+1 + 𝑃𝑡𝑏𝑡+1  ≤   𝑀𝑡 + 𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶𝑡 𝐼𝑡
𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶 + 𝑃𝑡𝑅𝑡 𝑏𝑡 + 𝑃𝑡𝑔𝑡,     ∀𝑡. 
The classic no-Ponzi condition has to hold: 
lim
𝑇→∞






The government dynamic budget constraint can be iterated over time and expressed as an 




∑𝛽𝑡+1 𝑚𝑡+1 (𝐼𝑡+1 − 1) + 𝛽












The government is assumed to internalize other agents’ behaviour. As a result, the 
intertemporal budget constraint becomes: 
(eq. 11.8) ∑ 𝛽𝑡+1 𝑚𝑡+1
ℎ  (𝐼𝑡+1 − 1) + 𝛽
𝑡+1 𝑐𝑏𝑑𝑐𝑡+1









ℎ  and 𝑐𝑏𝑑𝑐𝑡+1
ℎ  are real outside-money holdings demanded by households as a 
function of the interest rates and preferences. 
Furthermore, the government is committed to an inflation target mandate. As a result, it 
anchors the bond interest rate to the real interest rate in order to guarantee a constant inflation 
rate over time at the targeted level.  From 𝐼𝑡 ≡ (
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑃𝑡
) 𝑅𝑡+1, given the inflation target 𝛱, we 
get that: 
𝐼𝑡 = (1 + 𝛱) 𝑅𝑡+1. 
We explore two government behavioural specifications: 
(i) A Ramsey government which maximizes social welfare, 
(ii) A transfer-maximizer government which aims to get the most out of seigniorage. 
The government is constrained in the use of the bond rate. The additional policy tool the 
government has got, namely the CBDC rate, will then serve as a mean to reach the 
government’s goal. 
Ramsey government 
In the case of Ramsey government, the goal is to maximize social welfare. It means the 
economy will be directed toward a solution where monetary frictions are attenuated. Being 
constrained in the use of the bond rate, the best the government can do is to impose 𝐼𝑡+1
𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶 =
𝐼𝑡+1. 
This intuition can be clearly caught from equation 7 and Graph 6: as the spreads approach the 
zero-level, real consumption, and in turn social welfare, becomes bigger and bigger. 
The CBDC rate would indeed follow the bond rate, making CBDC absolutely friction-free. 




(𝜌 = 𝜑 = 0), this government behaviour would imply a scenario where it is not profitable for 
banks to issue any deposit (given 𝑘 > 0) and cash would be valued only if the bond interest 
rate was set to zero. The economy would then settle at the Friedman rule. In the proposed 
model, this is not the case. Indeed, in any specification, the government is committed to the 
inflation target mandate so that the bond rate is firmly anchored to the real interest rate. 
Transfer-maximizer government 
In such a case, the government goal is to maximize transfers with commitment, according to 
its preferences 𝐺(𝑔𝑡). Such function 𝐺 is assumed to be increasing and strictly concave. The 
government then chooses  𝑔𝑡 and 𝐼𝑡+1





s.t. ∑ 𝛽𝑡+1 𝑚𝑡+1
ℎ  (𝐼𝑡+1 − 1) + 𝛽
𝑡+1 𝑐𝑏𝑑𝑐𝑡+1









𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒  𝐼𝑡+1 = 𝛱 𝑅𝑡+2. 
Given the constraint multiplier 𝛾, the marginal conditions are: 
(𝑔𝑡)             𝐺
′(𝑔𝑡) =   𝛾 
(𝐼𝑡+1









𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶  ] =  0 
From equation (𝑔𝑡) it is deduced that government transfers are a constant stream in the 
optimum. 
Note also that the government can finance its transfers only through total seigniorage 
revenues, indeed the government problem is nothing else than a total seigniorage 
maximization. In particular, both types of outside-money generate seigniorage revenues, 
where cash-seigniorage is given by the function 𝑚𝑡+1
ℎ  (𝐼𝑡+1 − 1) and CBDC-seigniorage by 
𝑐𝑏𝑑𝑐𝑡+1
ℎ  st+1, and the total seigniorage is the sum of the two. By assuming CRRA 
preferences, we get total seigniorage function concave and non-monotone with respect to the 
CBDC rate. This is illustrated in Graph 8. 
From equation (𝐼𝑡+1




(𝑒𝑞. 12)         𝑠𝑡+1 =
𝜕𝑚𝑡+1









The CBDC rate choice can be seen as the result of two trade-off forces, the former concerns 
competition between cash and CBDC, the latter is CBDC related. When the CBDC rate falls, 
and in turn the policy spread goes up, households claim more cash to the detriment of CBDC, 
therefore cash-seigniorage is emphasized while CBDC-seigniorage gets dimed. This trade-off 
intuition is described by the first addend of equation 12. Furthermore, as the policy spread 
widens, CBDC supply gets dimed while the marginal CBDC-seigniorage revenue (which is 
the policy spread itself) increases. This trade-off intuition is captured by the second addend of 
equation 12. Ultimately, the government will move the policy spread to the point at which the 
negative effect on CBDC-seigniorage is just offset by the positive effect on CBDC-
seigniorage, generating in fact the highest total seigniorage. 
 
No inflation target mandate 





In the case of non-commitment to an inflation target mandate, both policy instruments would 
be employed. 
In that case, as in Marimon et al. (2003), the Ramsey government would impose both rates at 
the zero-level, which implies an unconditioned Friedman rule. 
A seigniorage maximizer government would instead look for the ideal combination of bond 
and CBDC rates to get the most in terms of total seigniorage. It is interesting to note that in 
such scenario the government appears to compete against itself as it is the provider of two 
competing payment means. In that case the FOCs would be: 
(𝑔𝑡)         𝐺
′(𝑔𝑡) =   𝜆 
(𝐼𝑡+1)        𝜆 𝛽
𝑡+1  [ 𝑚𝑡+1










] =   0  
(𝐼𝑡+1










𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶  ] =  0 
 
3.4 CLEARING CONDITIONS 
In equilibrium markets clear. As discussed in the household section, equilibrium in the goods 
and labour markets imply: 





Equilibrium in the financial markets implies: 










(eq. 17)           𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶𝑡 = 𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶𝑡
ℎ . 
4.0 EQUILIBRIA 
In this chapter I will discuss the model equilibria in all the set up specifications for all the 
agents. I will then discuss what is the CBDC role into the specified economy through the 




4.1 PERFECT DIGITAL SUBSTITUTES IN A PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE 
BANKING SECTOR. 
Perfect competition in the banking sector entails a fixed intermediation spread 𝜃𝑡
𝑓
, always 
inflexibly equal to the marginal cost of deposit issuance 𝑘. Government commitment to the 
inflation target implies that the bond rate, 𝐼𝑡, is anchored to exogenous variables such as the 
real interest and the inflation target level. 
Perfect substitutability across digital instruments implies that only the most convenient digital 
substitute is actually held in equilibrium, while in case of even any combination of CBDC and 
deposits (summing up to the same required value) would be optimal as the agent is indifferent 
between the two.  
Ramsey government 
As discussed in section 3.3, a Ramsey government –in the attempt of maximizing social 
welfare- would mitigate monetary frictions by imposing the policy spread at zero. 
(eq. 18) 𝑠𝑒𝑞 = 0 
(eq. 19)           𝜃𝑓
𝑒𝑞
= 𝑘 
(eq. 20)           𝐼𝑒𝑞 = (1 + 𝛱)𝑅 
 Equations 18 and 19, (𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶𝑡+1)′, (𝐸𝑡+1
′ ), and equation 16 imply that: 
  𝐸𝑒𝑞 = 0 
From equation 11.5 we get: 
  𝑐𝑓 = 0 
For any 𝑘 > 0, deposits are deviated out of circulation as their holding cost, 𝑘, is indeed 
higher than the one inherent in CBDC. 
From equations 9, 10, 15 and 17 it derives that: 
  𝑀𝑒𝑞 = 0 
(eq. 21) 𝑐𝑏𝑑𝑐𝑒𝑞 = 𝛼−
1
𝜎 









Cash is deviated out of circulation as well, and the stock of CBDC –under the binding cash-
in-advance constraint- is then just equal to the money good consumption amount. 
Furthermore, given the absence of monetary frictions, the money-good consumption matches 
the credit-good consumption in equilibrium. 
As a result, inside-money competition does not play any role in conditioning the Ramsey-
government choice. Such attainment confirms Marimon et al. (2003) conclusion, according to 
which inside-money competition might generate boundaries on government manoeuvre from 
above, and such boundaries are not being met by a government pursuing the Friedman-rule. 
Given 𝑐𝑓 = 0, from equations 13, 21 and 22 we get: 
𝑛𝑒𝑞 = 2 𝛼−
1
𝜎 
From the government problem we know that the amount of transfers is zero, because of zero 
seigniorage revenues. The amount of bonds in circulation is derived from the household 
budget constraint which has to bind in equilibrium. 
Finally, we assumed constant inflation –guaranteed by commitment to the inflation target- 
and constant real interest rate over time. As a result, in equilibrium the bond interest rate 
increases constantly at the price level pace, as well as all the nominal variables, such as the 
stock of CBDC. 
Transfer-maximizer government 
Given that the government internalizes other agents’ behaviour, CBDC rate is going to be set 
at the light of the concomitant inside-money competition.  
CRRA preferences assure that the total seigniorage is a concave function of the policy spread 
and that it has a unique maximum8. 
(Assumption 1) In the absence of inside-money competition, the policy spread which 
maximizes the total seigniorage function is assumed to be higher than 
𝑘. Given that the function is monotone, the derivative is then positive 
for 𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝜃𝑡+1
𝑓
= 𝑘.  
                                                          




As a result, in order to catch the whole digital money demand, the government best choice is 
to set a policy spread slightly smaller than the competitive intermediation spread as a Bertrand 
competitor would do. 
(eq. 21) 𝑠𝑒𝑞 = 𝑘 − 𝜇   where 𝜇 is positive and arbitrarily small. 
(eq. 19)           𝜃𝑓
𝑒𝑞
= 𝑘 
(eq. 20)           𝐼𝑒𝑞 = (1 + 𝛱)𝑅 where 𝑅 and 𝛱 are constant. 
It then comes obvious that inside-money competition –in such setting- generates boundaries 
to the government, which is forced to step the CBDC rate up to a point where CBDC is 
valued. Such mechanics is illustrated in Graph 9 and Graph 10, where the deposit demand 
and supply are drawn in various contingencies. In particular, Graph 10 shows deposit supply 
as a vertical line in the case of perfect competition ( = 0), meaning that for any quantity of 
deposits the intermediaries are set to deliver always the same spread. Graph 9 shows that in 
this case (𝜌 = 0) deposit demand is not smooth, meaning that the government is constrained 
to set a policy spread lower or equal to the intermediation spread because of the eventual 
zeroing of its CBDC-seigniorage revenues. 
 








Equations 21, 19, (𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶𝑡+1)′, (𝐸𝑡+1
′ ), and 16 imply that: 
  𝐸𝑒𝑞 = 0 
From equation 11.5 we get: 
  𝑐𝑓 = 0 
From the household problem and the clearing conditions, we have that: 


































































































































































From the equations just reported, we see how the inefficiency of inside-money, 𝑘, together 
with the inflation target, is a key determinant of the money-consumption outcome. 
𝑔𝑒𝑞 is determined through equation 11.8, as the government gives all the seigniorage 
revenues gained back to households in the form of transfers. Bond equilibrium quantity is 
determined from the household budget constraint. 
As a result, inside-money competition appears to discipline government policy usage of 
CBDC against the threat of a takeover. Such attainment is again conformed to Marimon et al. 
(2003) findings, where the bond interest rate (and then inflation) is bounded in a context of 
perfect substitutability between cash and deposits. In the model just presented –in a context of 
perfect substitutability between CBDC and deposits- we find bond rate free of pursuing the 
inflation target and the CBDC rate constrained instead. 





Assume 𝑅 and 𝛱 constant. Bond interest rate is then constant as in equation 20. 
As shown before, the unique bank’s supply of deposits is an increasing function of the 
intermediation spread. The demand for deposits, in a context of perfect substitutability 
between digital instruments, is given by: 
(eq. 25) 𝑒𝑡








𝑑 ,           𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜃𝑡+1 < 𝑠𝑡+1
𝛿,                              𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜃𝑡+1 < 𝑠𝑡+1
0 ,                               𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜃𝑡+1 > 𝑠𝑡+1 
  







Deposit supply is described in equation 11.6. 
Graph 7 shows how the deposit demand, as a function of the intermediation spread, changes 
according to the policy spread in this equilibrium scenario. In words, when the intermediation 
spread is lower than the policy spread, deposits are cheaper to hold than CBDC, so the 
demand for CBDC is zero while deposits are valued in equilibrium together with cash. On the 
other hand, when the intermediation spread is higher than the policy spread, deposits are not 
valued. When the cost opportunity of holding deposits coincides with the CBDC one, 







𝑑 ) is possible in the optimum. 
Graph 7 allows us to catch the important intuition that the deposit market happens to meet 
where the intermediation spread is equal to the policy spread, except for the cases where the 
policy spread is too large. This eventuality is excludable because it would imply zero CBDC-
seigniorage revenues, so that neither a Ramsey nor a transfer-maximizer government would 
choose any spread so large. So, from equation 25 and equation 11.6 we get that: 
(eq. 26)   𝜃𝑒𝑞 = 𝑠𝑒𝑞 
As a result, (𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶𝑡+1)
′ and (𝐸𝑡+1)′ are both satisfied in equilibrium so that both digital 

























































































































Equation 27 explains how the deposits market determines the holding shares of deposits and 
CBDC. Referring again to Graph 7, please notice that the total demand for digital money 
(first addend of equation 27) is given by the top-left horizontal line, which indeed happens to 
match deposit demand when 𝜃𝑡+1 < 𝑠𝑡+1. Note that for higher equilibrium spreads, the bank 
would supply an higher amount of deposits (second addend of the equation 27) while the 
government would integrate for the remaining part of the total demand. In particular, 
according to the proposed parameterization, when 𝑠 = 0.5% basically all the digital money is 
in CBDC form; when 𝑠 = 1% households hold some deposits but CBDC is still the favourite 
digital money; when 𝑠 = 1.5% CBDC is not valued and only deposits are used. As this result 
is highly dependent on the bank’s behaviour, the cost structure of the bank (namely 𝑘 and ) 
turns out to be key. 
Ramsey government 
As discussed before, a Ramsey government –in the attempt of maximizing social welfare- 
would mitigate monetary friction by imposing a zero policy spread. For an intermediation 
spread equal to zero the unique bank is not willing to supply a positive amount of deposits, so 
that the deposit market is in equilibrium with null demand and supply of deposits.  





So, inside-money competition does not play any role in conditioning the Ramsey-government 
choice and such attainment goes in line with our previous finding in an environment with 
perfectly competitive banks. 
Transfer-maximizer government 
A transfer-maximizer government which internalizes agents’ behaviour will undertake policy 
decisions at the light of such malleable deposit market. In a context of perfect competition 
between banks we concluded that CBDC policy manoeuvre space was bounded because of a 
low and inflexible intermediation spread imposition; now –on the contrary- the CBDC interest 
rate clearly plays a disciplinary role into the deposit market, whose equilibrium rate is 
anchored to the CBDC one. 
As described in equation 10, when the spreads increase households are willing to hold less 
digital money (in total) than before. 
As the spreads increase, the unique bank supplies more, and –given that the government 
supply CBDC on the remained demand for digital money- it implies that the share of deposits 
gets higher relative to CBDC. The opposite occurs when the policy spread falls. This 
mechanism is explained in equation 27 and Graph 7. 
The government will account for this operating mechanism in imposing the policy spread 
maximizing seigniorage revenues. In math, we have that the government maximizes the 
problem presented in section 3.3, whose solution is described in equation 12, integrating 
equations 17 and 17.2 in it. So we have that the equilibrium policy spread is the solution of 





















































































































































































































































⇒ (eq. 28) 𝑠𝑒𝑞 = 𝑠(𝑘, , 𝛱, 𝑅, 𝜌, 𝜎, 𝛼) 
This attainment is in line with Chiu et al. (2019) finding, according to which CBDC -even in 
the case of low usage- would serve as an outside option for households, thus limiting banks’ 
market power in the deposit market. Therefore CBDC is found to be an effective monetary 
policy tool capable of sharp effect on depositors by directly influencing the deposit rate. Note 
that –in this environment- also movements of the bond interest rate would be effective in 
conditioning the deposit rate, and it would be still valid even without a CBDC into the 
economy. This is in line with Woodford (2000), who argues that cash maintains its MP 
effectiveness even in the case of deposit takeover, so that CBDC is not really a necessity. In 




seigniorage purpose- which are not obtainable at once with a single policy instrument. 














































As you can see, the inefficiency of inside money does not influence directly the equilibrium 
level of money-good consumption –as we found out in the scenario with perfect competition 
in the banking sector through equation 24- but the influence is indirect through the 
government choice of the policy spread, which appear corrupted by inside-money competition 
but not as rigidly as we ascertained in the former case. 
4.3 IMPERFECT DIGITAL SUBSTITUTES IN A PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE 
BANKING SECTOR. 
In the case of imperfect substitutability of digital instruments, there is no threat of deposits 
takeover (i.e. a corner solution) as households are always willing to hold a positive amount of 
each payment means in their portfolios, except for the cases of zero spreads. 
A Ramsey government imposes a zero policy spread in every period, as discussed before. 
Equilibrium conditions match the ones in section 4.1. 
A transfer-maximizer government imposes the policy spread that solves equation 12. 
As in equations 2 to 6, the household portfolio composition will result from the outstanding 
interest rates and payment preferences. The bigger the difference between money holding 
costs, the more unbalanced the portfolio composition will be; and the more money types are 




𝐶𝐵𝐷𝐶, the model predicts that the households payment choice (at time 𝑡) will 
result in a deposit-to-CBDC ratio higher than one; in particular, we know that the bigger the 
rates differential the bigger the ratio. As 𝜑 get closer to zero such rates differential becomes 
more and more relevant, to the point that –when 𝜑 = 0- even the tiniest positive rate 
differential would result in a deposit takeover.  
So, from equations 11.51, 20, 12 and Assumption 1 we have that: 




 𝐼𝑒𝑞 = (1 + 𝛱)𝑅 
 𝑠𝑒𝑞 = 𝑠(𝑘, , 𝛱, 𝑅, 𝜌, 𝜎, 𝛼) > 𝑘 
From the household problem and clearing conditions we get: 



























































































































































































































































What is interesting here is that deposits demand is now a decreasing and well-behaved 
function of the intermediation spread, and depends on the interest rate combination and on 
preferences (both on payments and consumption), in contrast with the discontinue demand 




fixed intermediation spread in delivering the optimal policy spread, but it no longer represents 
a concrete boundary to monetary policy. In other words, we can say that inside money 
competition plays again a role in conditioning CBDC rate adoption, but the contingency of 
imperfect substitutability across digital instruments –which rules out the possibility of deposit 
takeover- alleviates what was previously identified as a boundary. 
The idea that the CBDC rate is lower than the deposit rate, which comes from the assumption 
1, is coherent with the intuition provided by the BIS (2018) according to which the CBDC 
rate would operate as a floor for market rates. 
4.4 IMPERFECT DIGITAL SUBSTITUTES WITH A SIGLE INSIDE-MONEY 
PROVIDER. 
A Ramsey government, as we have already learnt, would adopt a zero policy spread implying 
the equilibrium described in section 4.1. 
Transfer-maximizer government 
Assume constant inflation target 𝛱 and real interest rate 𝑅, so that equation 20 holds. 
A government oriented toward seigniorage, would account for inside-money dynamics in 
delivering the optimal policy spread. In order to catch this intuition, let us focus on the deposit 
market. In this setting, we finally have both deposit demand and supply well-behaved, so that 
we find that the equilibrium intermediation spread is an increasing function of the other 
spreads. Indeed, from equations 11.6, 6 and 16 we have that 𝜃𝑒𝑞 is such that the following 










































































⇒ (eq. 33)  θeq = 𝜃(𝑠𝑒𝑞) 





From the government problem we obtain: 
(eq. 34) 𝑠𝑒𝑞 = 𝑠(θeq) 
Equation 33 describes how an higher policy spread means more demand for deposits and in 
turn an higher resulting intermediation spread. As we found out in the case of perfect 
substitutability, the single bank behaviour is disciplined by CBDC policy, anyway imperfect 
substitutability –through a smooth decreasing deposit demand- makes such disciplinary role 
less stringent, so that the intermediation spread is not perfectly anchored to the policy spread, 
but it is positively correlated to it. Again, this case scenario may provide an example of how 
CBDC can be used as an effective and direct MP tool through the deposit transmission 
channel. 
Equation 34 depicts the fact that the government looks at the bank action in a competitive 
way. When the government increases the CBDC rate, the bank –in the attempt to maximize 
profits- moves the intermediation spread in the same direction, and the combination of the 




two spreads generates an effect in terms of total-seigniorage, for instance, cash-seigniorage 
would increase for sure. So the equilibrium, deriving from the intersection of equations 33 
and  34, corresponds to a state of the world where the government set the CBDC rate such 
that total seigniorage is maximized and the bank imposes the intermediation spread that 
actually maximizes its profit. 
Finally, the equilibrium level of the spreads differs from the one identified in section 4.3, 
where the intermediation spread was exogenously given by the inside-money inefficiency 
parameter 𝑘, and the government –once set the bond interest rate according to the inflation 
target- reacted to those exogenously determined values. In this section, the intermediation 
spread resulting from banking activity is endogenous and correlated to the policy spread, that 
makes the government policy decision more complex and most importantly it makes CBDC a 
proper policy tool. All the other equilibrium conditions match the ones reported in section 4.3. 
4.4 CASE STUDY: E-krona 
We can think at Sweden’s money competition from a model perspective where the banking 
sector is perfectly competitive, and available payment means are treated as imperfect 
substitutes. Furthermore, we could account for the special Swedish household payment 
preferences which turns out not to be in favour of cash, probably because of the conjunction 
of a stronger sensitiveness to money convenience, efficiency, accessibility, and a weaker 
sensitiveness to anonymity. So, it appears fair to consider the cost of holding cash boosted by 
a  specific parameter accounting for that. So, with reference to section 4.3, the monetary 
equilibrium applied to the Swedish case would appear as an equilibrium where households 
hold relatively few cash, where CBDC is not impactful on the deposit market and –under the 
assumption of a small 𝑘- CBDC would not really induce a relevant improvement in the digital 
payment market, which is in fact already perfectly competitive and efficient. 
As a conclusion, given the assumptions we set for this case, we may convene that CBDC 
would not play a distinctive role in the money-competition mechanism in Sweden, and that it 
would not represent a direct monetary policy tool through the deposit channel. The question is 
then why the Riskbank sees CBDC as a needed solution against cash progressive 
disappearance. The answer cannot be found in the model built up in these pages. Referring to 




 Firstly, cash scarce usage would eventually threat cash acceptance. Therefore, 
households would no longer have access to outside money, which has a lower 
credit and liquidity risk than inside money. In other words, CBDC would 
induce a more sound payment system. 
 Secondly, CBDC can guarantee a usable alternative in the case of private-
sector prolonged disruption. 
 The lack of an outside money option can evolve in a context where monopoly 
situations can easily arise. As we discussed in paragraph 4.2 and 4.4, CBDC 
and cash –even in the case of short or null usage- put pressure on deposit 
interest rate as they represent the alternative payment option households can 
adopt in the case of banks’ change of attitude toward the price charged.  
Whether this circumstance is realistic or not, it is a question that requires 
further investigation on the composition of the Swedish banking sector. 
Anyway, I categorized this case study into a context of perfectly competitive 
banking sector as –on top of my knowledge- payment services appear to be 
often totally free of charge. 
 In a context of cash disappearance, CBDC would allow all those people who 
are excluded from having a bank account to continue having access to money. 
Such argument –presented in the introduction as the financial inclusion 
argument- is founded on the assumption that CBDC will be as accessible as 
cash is, which seems plausible even though the contingent technology barrier.  
 In a context of cash disappearance, CBDC would allow citizens to hold risk 
free state-money in the case of financial unease. Otherwise, the fundamental 
trust in the Swedish monetary policy system risks declining. 
As we discussed in the introduction, CBDC brings about risks concerning CB 
credibility connected to the possibility of CBDC fiasco or to excessive contact 
with the general public. As a conclusion on the matter, Riskbank will have to 
face possible credibility challenges in any case; anyway, a properly designed 





CBDC may represent a relevant innovation for monetary policy, payment systems and 
financial integration for underdeveloped countries –where the payment systems are slow in 
developing by the hand of the private sector, and financial integration is a significant issue- 
while may not be perceived as such in the context of a developed economy. Our model –even 
though it does not integrate such level of detail- confirms such intuition on the grounds that 
CBDC is assumed to be costless in real terms by construction, while bank deposits are not. In 
a scenario where 𝑘 is very high –namely the banking sector very inefficient in supplying 
deposits- the introduction of a CBDC would represent a potentially worthier tool in terms of 
social welfare enhancement. This first consideration refers to CBDC as an innovation into the 
payment market, which is supposed to be fostering social welfare independently of other 
monetary policy questions. It is then not surprising that countries like Ecuador and Tunisia 
have adopted a model of CBDC which does not bear interest: they were primarily interested 
in the opportunity of participating in the respective retail payment markets. 
Furthermore, Canada and Singapore central banks’ effort in studying DLT applications for 
interbank settlements lies on the same line. CBDC may bring about efficiency gains in the 
wholesale transfer and settlement systems –like reducing intermediation costs-, regardless of 
other monetary policy questions. 
We have seen many specifications of the model, where households perceive CBDC and 
deposits as perfect or imperfect substitutes; the banking sector is inhabited by one price-taker 
bank or infinite perfectly-competitive banks; the government is a Ramsey or a transfers-
oriented government. 
In the case of Ramsey-government, the equilibria in all the specifications are characterized by 
a CBDC dominance over other instruments, which are in fact deviated out of circulation. Such 
occurrence enhances social welfare, as the cost opportunity of holding money –namely the 
real cost of consumption today-  is drop down to zero and privately issued money –which 
bears real costs- is not valued.  
So, the discussed models allow us to conclude that a CBDC in the hand of a Ramsey-
government can serve as a second monetary policy tool for welfare enhancement, and can 
play a role in disciplining the deposit market toward lower intermediation rates. 
In concordance with Marimon et al. (2003), inside money competition does not impose any 




A transfer-maximizer government, as discussed previously, may want to impose a relatively 
high policy spread in the view of maximizing its preferences for transfers. When CBDC and 
deposits are perceived as perfect substitutes the policy spread and the intermediation spread 
appear to be perfectly correlated in equilibrium: when the banking sector is perfectly 
competitive, the CBDC rate follows the exogenously determined deposit rate; when the 
banking sector is inhabited by a single price-taker bank, the deposit rate is anchored to the 
CBDC rate instead.  
As we concluded in sections 4.1, perfect competition in the banking sector turns out to have a 
disciplinary role over CBDC rate decision, as the CB needs to avoid deposit takeover in order 
to gain seigniorage revenues to finance its transfers. This finding goes perfectly in line with  
Marimon et al. (2003), who concluded that inside-money competition happens to play a 
disciplinary role over the bond interest rate under similar assumptions. 
As we discussed in section 4.2, in the case of  single price-taker bank, even though the 
government’s policy spread choice is influenced by the deposit supply, in equilibrium the 
intermediation spread is anchored to the policy spread. As a conclusion, we can say that in 
this contingency CBDC appears to be an effective monetary policy tool, capable of 
influencing –in a perfect way- the deposit market rate. 
In conclusion, what appears clear from the analysis illustrated so far is that CBDC efficacy as 
a monetary policy tool depends highly on the structure and/or competitiveness of the banking 
sector in which it is supposed to operate. Where the banking sector is not competitive or it is 
inefficient, CBDC is powerful and potentially welfare-enhancing, while it may be superfluous 
where the banking sector is already well competitive and efficient. 
When CBDC and deposits are perceived as imperfect substitutes, the policy spread and the 
intermediation spread appear to be positively (but not perfectly) correlated. 
As discussed in section 4.3, inside-money competition puts pressure over the government 
CBDC rate choice without the threat of a deposit takeover, meaning that the exogenously 
determined intermediation spread does not represent in this case a  stringent boundary to the 
policy spread. We conclude that imperfect substitutability alleviates inside-money 
competition boundary over monetary policy action. 
As discussed in section 4.4, the CBDC rate works as an effective monetary policy tool as it 
directly influences the deposit rate. On this regard, it is fundamental to notice that money 




down, elasticity decreases and CBDC gets less impactful on the deposit market as the 
correlation between CBDC and deposit rates weakens. 
In conclusion, CBDC relevance as an effective monetary policy tool appears definitely reliant 
on consumers’ perception of the available payment means as well as on the structure and 
competitiveness of the banking sector. CBDC is found to be more beneficial as a monetary 
policy instrument in a context where CBDC and deposits are perceived as perfect substitutes 
and where the banking sector lacks competitiveness and efficiency. 
5.1 LIMITATION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The thesis limitations and the possibility of future improvements are clearly related to: 
(i) the simplicity of the model used. In particular, the model ignores that households 
have preferences over anonymity, efficiency and other money design features, and 
that they are risk-averse; a more detailed specification of the banking activity 
(including lending and investment activities) would make the analysis more 
reliable, realistic and could also tell us more about other variables involved into 
the mechanics. 
(ii) The absence of proper calibration. Calibrating the model would allows us to 
estimate the impact of CBDC policy manoeuvres on monetary aggregates demand 
and on the broader economy. 
In general, the future economic research in the field of CBDC is probably going to be based 














PARAMETER DEFINITION VALUE 
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Bank return to scale. 
Marginal cost of deposits 
issuance is indeed: 
MC=𝑘*(1 + )*𝑒𝜀 
0 
𝑘 
Constant marginal real cost 
of deposit issuance when =
0. 
MC=𝑘*(1 + )*𝑒𝜀 
0.01 
𝛱 Inflation target. 1.5% 
R Real interest rate 0.5% 
𝜌 
Imperfect substitutability 
between cash and digital 
money. It varies between zero 





between CBDC and bank 
deposits. It varies between 





Household constant elasticity 










Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, Markets Committee (2018). Central bank 
digital currencies. Bank for international settlements. 
Jonathan Chiu, Mohammad Davoodalhosseini, Janet Jiang and Yu Zhu (2019). Central Bank 
Digital Currency and Banking. Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper 2019-20. 
Ricardo Lagos (2006). Inside and Outside Money. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
Research Department Staff Report 374. 
Ramon Marimon, Juan Pablo Nicolini, Pedro Teles (2003). Inside–outside money 
competition. Journal of Monetary Economics 50 (2003) 1701–1718. 
Nurjannah Ahmat, Sabrina Bashir (2017). Central Bank Digital Currency: A Monetary Policy 
Perspective. Bank Negara Malaysia’s Staff Insights. 
The Riksbank’s e-krona project: report 1 (2017). Sveriges Riskbank. 
 The Riksbank’s e-krona project: report 2 (2018). Sveriges Riskbank. 
Walter Engert and Ben S. C. Fung (2017). Central Bank Digital Currency: Motivations and 
Implications. Bank of Canada Staff Discussion Paper 2017-16. 
Jonathan Chiu, Thorsten Koeppl (2017). The Economics of Cryptocurrencies – Bitcoin and 
Beyond. Bank of Canada. 
Jack Meaning, Ben Dyson, James Barker and Emily Clayton (2018). Broadening narrow 
money: monetary policy with a central bank digital currency. Bank of England, Staff Working 
Paper No. 724. 
John Barrdear and Michael Kumhof (2016). The macroeconomics of central bank issued 
digital currencies. Bank of England, Staff Working Paper No. 605. 
Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde, Daniel Sanches (2018). On the Economics of Digital Currencies. 
Federal reserve Bank of Philadelphia WP 18-07. 
